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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols
that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale
and Shapley’s original stable marriage problem[3]: n men and n women
each privately hold a total and strict ordering on all of the members of
the opposite gender. They wish to collaborate in order to find a stable
matching—a pairing of the men and women such that no unmatched pair
mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners in the matching. We
show that any communication protocol (deterministic, nondeterministic,
or randomized) that correctly outputs a stable matching requires Ω(n2)
bits of communication. Thus, the original algorithm of Gale and Shapley
is communication-optimal up to a logarithmic factor. We then introduce
a “divorce metric” on the set of all matchings, which allows us to consider
approximately stable matchings. We describe an efficient algorithm to
compute the “distance to stability” of a given matching. We then show
that even under the relaxed requirement that a protocol only yield an
approximate stable matching, the Ω(n2) communication lower bound still
holds.
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1 Introduction
Our story is the confluence of two classical narratives in theoretical computer
science. First is the stable marriage problem, which was initially formalized
and studied by Gale and Shapley in 1962, see [3]. Second is the theory of
communication complexity introduced by Yao in 1979, see [11]. Each of these
celebrated works has had tremendous impact on theoretical computer science.
In this essay, we use tools from communication complexity in order to study
the stable marriage problem. Our work shows that communication is a major
impediment to efficiently solving an instance of the stable marriage problem. We
begin with a brief overview of the stable matching problem and some results we
will require from communication complexity.
The study of the communication complexity of the stable marriage problem
was initiated by [10]. Their work showed that for exact computation of a stable
matching, Ω(n2) communication is required for deterministic and nondetermin-
istic protocols. Our generalization of this result to randomized protocols is of
interest because randomized protocols can be exponentially more efficient than
their deterministic or nondeterministic counterparts.
In [2], the authors consider the communication complexity of approximate
stable matchings. They use an “unstable partners” notion of approximate stabil-
ity. They prove a lower bound of Ω(n2 log n) communication for a deterministic
sketching model of communication. In their communication model, a central
processor queries the players about their preferences where all computation and
messages are deterministic.
In this paper we generalize the Ω(n2) communication lower bound of [10]
to account for randomized communication protocols–see theorem 2. Next, we
consider a relaxation of the stable marriage problem to protocols which com-
pute approximate stable matchings. We define a notion of approximate stable
matching (divorce distance to stability) and show that even for this relaxation an
Ω(n2) lower bound still holds for randomized algorithms. Our communication
model is more general than that considered in [2], but our notion of approxi-
mate stability is more restrictive. Nonetheless, we believe our result (theorem
5) is the first such lower bound for interactive communication with any notion
of approximate stability.
1.1 Stable Marriage Problem
Let X and Y be sets of n women and n men, respectively, who wish to form
couples. We denote the men Y = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and the women X =
{w1, w2, . . . , wn}. A matching M is a one-to-one correspondence between men
and women:
M = {(m1, wi1), (m2, wi2), . . . , (mn, win)}
where each woman wi appears exactly once in M . We call a pair (m,w) ∈ M
a couple in M . Notice that we can describe a matching M by a permutation
σ : [n]→ [n] where M = {(mi, wσ(i)) ∣∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
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In our model, each man and woman holds a ranking of all the players of
the opposite gender. The ranking is a complete list where all preferences are
strict—i.e., a linear order. We say man m prefers w to w′ and write
w <m w
′
if w appears before w′ in m’s ranking, and symmetrically for the women. Given
a matching M , we call a pair (m,w) blocking if (m,w) /∈ M , but m and w
mutually prefer each other to their partners in M . Specifically, (m,w) /∈ M is
blocking if (m,w′), (m′, w) ∈M with
w <m w
′ and m <w m′.
A matching M is stable if it contains no blocking pairs. The stable marriage
problem is to find a stable matching given the preferences of the men and
women.
Gale and Shapley showed that given any instance of the stable marriage
problem (i.e., any list of preferences for the men and women) there exists a
stable matching. They accomplished this by describing the following “deferred
acceptance” algorithm which computes a stable matching: in the first round,
the men all propose to their most preferred woman. Each woman receiving
proposals rejects all but her most preferred among the men who proposed to
her, but defers accepting any proposals until the end of the algorithm. In the
second round, the rejected men propose to their second-most preferred women,
and again the women reject all but their most favored proposal so far. The
algorithm terminates when all of the women have been proposed to. At this
time, all of the women accept their deferred proposals. It is straightforward to
show (see [3]) that this algorithm yields a stable matching and that the process
terminates in O(n2) steps.
Notice that in an execution of the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, the pref-
erences of each man are revealed by the sequence of their proposals, while the
women’s preferences are revealed by their rejections. In particular, it may be
the case that a constant fraction of the men must reveal a constant fraction
of their preferences. We will use communication complexity to show that any
correct protocol for the stable marriage problem requires this much (Ω(n2))
communication.
1.2 Communication Complexity
In its simplest incarnation, communication complexity is concerned with the
following problem: suppose two players, Alice and Bob wish to collaborate to
compute a boolean function f(x, y), where
f : X × Y −→ {0, 1} .
Alice and Bob know x and y, respectively, but each has no information about
the other’s input. How many bits must Alice and Bob exchange in order to
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determine f(x, y)? Yao first formalized the notion of a communication protocol
and gave methods for proving lower bounds on communication complexity in
[11]. We quantify communication complexity of f by the number of bits Alice
and Bob must exchange (in the worst case) to compute f(x, y). For our pur-
poses, communication protocols may be randomized. It is interesting to note
that randomized protocols for a function f may require exponentially less com-
munication than their deterministic or nondeterministic counterparts. See [7]
for a delightful introduction to communication complexity.
Of particular interest to us is the disjointness function: DISJ(x, y). Alice
and Bob hold subsets A,B ⊂ [n], respectively. The value of the disjointness
function is 1 if A ∩B = ∅, and 0 otherwise. We can encode DISJ as a boolean
function by associating to A and B their characteristic vectors:
xi = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ A and yj = 1 ⇐⇒ j ∈ B.
Thus, we can express DISJ in terms of the boolean formula
DISJ(x, y) = ¬
n∨
i=1
(xi ∧ yi). (1)
We will rely heavily on the following result:
Theorem 1 ([6], [9]). Any (randomized) protocol which correctly computes
DISJ(x, y) with probability at least 2/3 requires Ω(n2) communication. In fact,
this lower bound holds even if we require that inputs x and y are either disjoint
or uniquely intersecting: |x ∩ y| ∈ {0, 1}.
Our results on communication lower bounds will follow from defining suitable
embeddings of DISJ into instances of the stable marriage problem such that
finding a stable matching reveals the value of DISJ. We will assume that the
input to DISJ satisfies the promise that |x ∩ y| ∈ 0, 1.
2 Lower Bound for Exactly Stable Matches
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Any protocol (deterministic, nondeterministic, or randomized)
that for any set of preferences finds a stable matching requires Ω(n2) bits of
communication between the men and women.
Notice that up to a logarithmic factor, this lower bound is tight. Indeed,
the players of each gender hold a total of n sets of preferences, where each
preference list is a permutation of n. Thus there are (n!)2n distinct stable
marriage instances of size n. Therefore, specifying a single instance requires
log((n!)2n) = Θ(n2 log n)
bits in any reasonable encoding. The trivial communication protocol of, say,
the men sending all of their preferences then uses O(n2 log n), which up the the
factor of log n matches our lower bound.
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2.1 The Special Case n = 2
As mentioned before, we will prove theorem 2 by embedding any instance of
DISJ into a stable marriage problem such that the structure of a stable matching
reveals the value of DISJ. Before describing the embedding in full generality,
we look at the special case of DISJ where Alice and Bob each hold a single
bit. Thus DISJ(x, y) = 1 if and only if at least one of the bits is 0. In this
case, we will have n = 2 men and women. We use Alice’s bit to determine the
women’s preferences, and Bob’s bit to determine the men’s preferences. Here is
our embedding for the women’s preferences:
player preferences if x = 1 preferences if x = 0
w1 1, 2 2, 1
w2 1, 2 1, 2
The men’s preferences are identical replacing ws with ms and x with y. It
is easy to show (by brute force) that for these preferences the unique stable
matching is M = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} if x = y = 1 and M = {(1, 2), (2, 1)} otherwise.
In particular, the (unique) stable matching contains the couple (1, 1) if and only
if DISJ(x, y) = 0.
2.2 The General Case
We are now ready to describe how to construct the women’s preferences from a
vector x whose entries are indexed by the (i, j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. The preference
structure for w depends on her parity.
even women (w = w2j): In this case w’s preferences are independent of x.
Her preferences are
m1 <w m3 <w · · · <w m2i−1 <w · · · <w mn−1 <w m2 <w m4 <w · · · <w mn.
In particular, w prefers all odd men to even men.
odd women (w = w2j−1): In this case w’s preferences are assigned according
to the following groups:
1. Odd men m2i−1 such that x(i,j) = 1
2. Even men m2i
3. Odd men m2i−1 such that x(i,j) = 0
Then w prefers all men in group 1 to group 2, and all men in group 2 to
group 3. Within the groups, w’s preferences are increasing in i. That is
mi <w mi′ if and only if i < i
′.
The preferences for the men are determined analogously to the women’s prefer-
ences: just replace ws with ms and x with y.
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2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 will follow immediately from the following claim. We say that a
couple (m,w) ∈M is odd if m = m2i+1 and w = w2j+1 for some i, j ∈ N.
Claim 3. Assume that x, y ∈ {0, 1}n2/4 satisfy |x ∩ y| ∈ {0, 1}. Given the
preferences described above, a stable matching M contains an odd couple if and
only if DISJ(x, y) = 0.
Proof. We first consider the case where DISJ(x, y) = 0. That is, there is a unique
index (i, j) such that x(i,j) = y(i,j) = 1. We will show that (m2i−1, w2j−1) ∈M
for any stable matching. To this end, suppose to contrary that (m2i−1, w2j−1) /∈
M for some stable matching M . Since M is stable, (m2i−1, w2j−1) is not a
blocking pair. Without loss of generality assume that w2j−1 is matched with
someone she prefers to m2i−1. Since x(i,j) = 1, the only men she could prefer to
m2i−1 are m2i′−1 with x(i′,j) = 1 and i′ < i. Since (i, j) is the unique element
in the intersection of x and y, we must have y(i′,j) = 0, hence m2i′−1 prefers
all even women to w(2j−1). Since there are n/2 even women, n/2 odd men and
m2i′−1 is matched with an odd woman, some even woman w2j′ is matched with
an even man. But even women prefer all odd men to even men. Therefore
(m2j′−1, w2j′) forms a blocking pair, contradicting the assumption that M was
stable. Therefore, (m2i−1, w2j−1) is contained in every stable matching. In
particular, every stable matching contains an odd couple.
We now consider the case where DISJ(x, y) = 1. We will show that no
stable matching M contains an odd couple. Suppose to the contrary that
(m2i−1, w2j−1) ∈ M for some (i, j). Since x and y are disjoint, x(i,j) = 0
or y(i,j) = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that x(i,j) = 0, so that w2j−1
prefers all even men to m2i−1. As before, some even man m2i′ is paired with
an even woman. But then w2j−1 and m2i′ mutually prefer each other to their
partners in M , hence M is not stable. Therefore, no stable marriage contains
an odd couple.
Proof of Theorem 2. Supppose that a protocol Π which given an instance of the
stable marriage problem finds a stable matching using B bits of communication.
Then given an instance of DISJ of size n/2, using the embedding described
above, we can compute DISJ(x, y) using B bits of communication: when Π
terminates, the men and women can both detect whether or not there is an odd
couple. By 1, B = Ω(n2), as desired.
Remark. In the above proof, we only account for communication between the
men and women, thus allowing, for example, the men to communicate among
each other free of charge. In the distributed setting, the preferences of each
player would be known only to that player. Yet our result shows that allowing
collaboration among the men and women still yields the near-optimal Ω(n2)
lower bound.
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3 Approximately Stable Matchings
Since we have proven that finding a stable matching essentially requires ex-
changing the entire input, we ask the following natural question: are there more
efficient protocols for the stable marriage problem if we are only required to
produce an “approximately stable” matching? Before addressing this question,
we must define what it means for a matching to be “approximately stable.”
There is no consensus in the literature on how to measure the instability of a
matching. We use a measure which we refer to as divorce distance.
Definition 4. For any pair of matchings M,M ′ of size n, we define the divorce
distance between M and M ′ to be
d(M,M ′) = n− |M ∩M ′| .
Note that d measures the minimum number of divorces required to convert M
to M ′ (or vice versa). By abuse of notation, we denote the divorce distance
to stability of a matching M to be
d(M) = min
M ′∈M
d(M,M ′)
where M is the set of all stable matchings for a given instance of the stable
marriage problem. Thus d(M) is the minimum number of divorces required to
convert M into a stable matching.
We find he divorce distance appealing because it is derived from a metric
on the set of all matchings between men and women. For the lower bound
arguments that follow, we will exclusively use the divorce distance.
3.1 Computing d(M)
Computing d(M) for an arbitrary instance of the stable matching problem and
matching M is highly nontrivial. A brute force approach would be to find all
stable matchings M ′ ∈ M and compute d(M) = min {d(M,M ′) |M ′ ∈M}.
However, |M| can be exponentially large in n, so this process is very inefficient.
It turns out that it is possible compute d(M) in polynomial time. The
idea is to exploit the structure of the set M. Following [4] we find that M
is a distributive lattice under a partial order where M ≤ M ′ if every man
(weakly) prefers his partner in M to his partner in M ′. Using this structure,
we can find a directed acyclic graph G(M) whose closed subsets are in one-to-
one correspondence with the elements of M. Further, this bijection respects
≤ where the order relation on the closed subsets of G(M) is set containment.
The graph G(M) is polynomial in size and be constructed from the players’
preferences in polynomial time (see [4].
Each vertex in G(M) is labelled by a rotation ρ. A rotation is an ordered
tuple of partners
(mi1 , wj1), (mi2 , wj2), . . . , (mik , wjk) ∈M ∈M
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such that the matching M ′ by pairing miα with wjα+1 for α = 1, 2, . . . , k and
maintaining the other pairs form M is stable. Using these rotations, we can
interpret the bijection of the previous paragraph in the following way. The
matching M associated to the closed subset F ⊂ G(M) is obtained by applying
the rotations ρ in F to the male-optimal stable matching M0 obtained from the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
To compute d(M) from G(M), we assign a weight to each rotation ρ given
by
fM (ρ) =
∣∣M ∩ {(miα , wjα+1}∣∣− |M ∩ ρ|
Thus fM (ρ) measures how much the distance d(M,M
′) changes when we apply
the rotation ρ to M ′ ∈M. The distance d(M) can then be found by computing
the maximum weight of a closed subset of G(M). Specifically
d(M) = d(M,M0) + max
S⊂G(M)
∑
ρ∈S
fM (ρ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣S is closed
 .
Once M0 and G(M) are known, d(M) can be computed in polynomial time by
linear programming (see [4]) or reduction to a max-flow/min-cut problem (see
[5]).
4 Lower Bound for Approximately Stable Match-
ings
In this section, we will prove that any protocol which output an approximately
stable matching requires Ω(n2) communication. We say that a matching M is
(1− ε)-stable or ε-unstable if d(M) ≤ εn.
Theorem 5. Suppose a protocol Π produces a (1 − ε) stable matching for
any instance of the stable matching problem with probability at least 2/3 and
0 < ε < 12 . Then Π requires Ω(n
2) communication between the men and women.
The idea of our proof is the same as the proof for exactly stable matchings:
embed a suitably large instance of DISJ into the stable matching problem such
that the players can infer the value of DISJ from the matching produced by Π.
Essentially, we show that small changes in the preferences of the players can
yield very large changes in the global structure of the stable matchings for those
preferences.
4.1 Description of the preferences
We divide the players into three groups: high, mid and low which we denote
Yh, Ym and Yl respectively for the men and Xh, Xm, Xl for the women. These
groups have size
|Xh| = |Yh| = 1
2
δn, |Xm| = |Ym| = 1
2
(1− δ)n, |Xl| = |Yl| = 1
2
n
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where δ is a parameter with 0 < δ < 1. The low and mid players preferences
will be fixed, while we will use the preferences of the high players to embed an
instance of disjointness of size (δn)2. We assume that the players are
X = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} , Y = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}
where in both cases the first δn/2 players are high, the next (1− δ)n/2 are mid
and the remaining players are low. Since the low and mid players’ preferences
are the same for all instances, we describe those first. As before, the players’
preferences are symmetric in the sense that the men and women’s preferences
are constructed analogously.
low players The low women prefer all of the men in order: m1 > m2 > · · · >
mn (and symmetrically for low men). In particular, each low player prefers
all high players to mid players to low players.
mid players The mid players prefer low players to high players to mid players.
Within each group, the preferences are “in order.” Speficially, the mid
women have preferences
mn/2+1 > mn/2+2 > · · · > mn > m1 > m2 > · · · > mn/2
and symmetrically for the men.
high players We assume that each of the high players holds a bit vector of
length δn. Together, the men and women’s preferences thus encode an
instance of DISJ of size (δn)2. For each wj ∈ Xh, we denote her bit vector
xj . She then constructs her preferences as follows. She prefers in order
1. men mi ∈ Yh such that x(j,i)(i) = 1;
2. men m ∈ Yl;
3. men m ∈ Ym;
4. men mi ∈ Yh such that x(j,i)(i) = 0.
Within each group, the women prefer men in numerical order. The men’s
preferences are constructed analogously.
4.2 Proof of the lower bound
Now that we have described the players’ preferences, we can prove theorem 5.
We break the proof up into several lemmas.
Lemma 6. Any instance of the stable marriage problem with preferences de-
scribed above corresponding to DISJ(x, y) = 1 has a unique stable matching
M0 given by
M0 =
{
(mi, wi+n/2)
∣∣ i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2} ∪ {(mi+n/2, wi) ∣∣ i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2} .
See figure 1.
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Yh
Ym
Yl
Xh
Xm
Xl
Figure 1: The (unique) stable matching for disjoint instances.
Proof. We first argue that every high and mid player is matched with a low
player. Suppose to the contrary that some m = mi with i ≤ n/2 is matched
with some w = wj for j ≤ n/2 in a matching M0. By the definition of the
preferences and the assumption that DISJ(x, y) = 0, at least one of m and w
prefers every low player to their partner. Assume without loss of generality that
m prefers all w′ = wj′ with j′ > n/2 to w. That is, m prefers all low women
to his partner w. Since m is paired with a medium or high woman, there must
be some low w′ that is paired with a low man m′. But w′ prefers all high and
medium men to m′. In particular she prefers m to m′. Therefore, (m,w′) is a
blocking pair, so M0 is not stable. Thus any stable matching must match low
players with mid or high players and vice versa.
Now we argue that if (mi, wj+n/2) ∈ M0, then we must have i = j. The
argument for pairs (mi+n/2, wj) is identical. Suppose that (mi, wj+n/2) ∈ M0
with i < j. Then there is some j′ < j such that w′ = wj′+n/2 is matched with
m′ = mi′ with i′ > i. But then (m,w′) mutually prefer each other, contradicting
the stability of M0. We arrive at a similar contradiction of i > j, hence we must
have i = j, as desired.
Lemma 7. Suppose we have stable matching instance with preferences de-
scribed above corresponding to DISJ(x, y) = 0 with x and y uniquely inter-
secting. Let xα,β = yα,β = 1 be the uniquely intersecting entry in the vectors.
10
Figure 2: The (unique) stable matching for intersecting instances.
Then the unique stable matching M1 is given by
M1 = {(mα, wβ)} ∪
{
(mi, wi+n/2)
∣∣ i < α} ∪ {(mi+n/2, wi) ∣∣ i < β}
∪ {(mi, wi+n/2−1), i < α ≤ n/2} ∪ {(mi+n/2−1, wi), i < β ≤ n/2}
∪ {(mn, wn)}
See figure 2.
Proof. We will first argue that (mα, wβ) ∈ M1 for any stable matching M1 for
the preferences described above. Since M is stable, if (mα, wβ) /∈ M , at least
one of mα and wβ , say mα, must be matched with someone he prefers to wβ .
From mα’s preferences, this implies that (mα, w) ∈ M1 for some w = wj with
j < β for which yα,j = 1. Since the instance of DISJ is uniquely intersecting, we
must have xα,j = 0. Thus w prefers all low men to mα. Since at most n/2− 1
medium and high women are paired with low men (indeed w is a high woman
paired with a high man) and there are n/2 low men, some low man m is paired
with a low woman. But then m and w mutually prefer each other, hence form
a blocking pair. Thus, we must have (mα, wβ) ∈M .
The remainder of the proof of the lemma is identical to the proof of lemma
6 if we remove mα and wβ from all the players’ preferences.
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Lemma 8. The matchings M0 and M1 from the previous two lemmas satisfy
d(M0,M1) ≥ (1− δ)n.
Proof. This follows from the following two observations:
1. All mid men and women Ym ∪Xm have different partners in M0 and M1.
2. No mid men are matched with mid women in either M0 or M1.
From these facts, we can conclude that
d(M0,M1) = n− |M0,M1| ≥ |Ym|+ |Xm| = (1− δ)n.
Proof of theorem 5. Suppose a protocol Π correctly outputs a matchingM which
is a (1 − ε)-stable matching using B bits of communication. Notice that for
the preference structure described above and ε < (1 − δ)/2, we then have
d(M,M0) ≤ εn < (1 − δ)n/2 if and only if DISJ(x, y) = 0. Since the play-
ers can compute d(M,M0) without communicationn they can determine the
value of DISJ. Thus, B = Ω(n2), as desired.
Corollary 9. Given a matching M and preferences for men and women, it
requires Ω(n2) communication to decide if M is (1− ε)-stable for any ε > 0.
Proof. Take M = M0 and choose preferences that embed DISJ as above.
5 Commentary
5.1 Time-space tradeoffs
Communication lower bounds naturally give time-space tradeoffs for any dis-
tributed model of computation. For the stable marriage problem, it is natural
to consider a distributed setting where each player is represented by a separate
processor that knows only its own preferences. The different processors then
need to communicate in order to find an (approximate) stable matching. There
are many different models of distributed computation [8], but most models have
two complementary notions of complexity:
1. Capacity—which we denote C—which is a measure of the length of indi-
vidual messages sent between the various processors;
2. Time—denoted T—which measures the number of communication rounds
required to carry out a computation.
The communication complexity of a distributed computational problem gives a
lower bound on the product CT , showing that both capacity and time cannot
be simultaneously optimized.
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We derived our communication lower bounds for the setting where a sin-
gle processor knows all the mens’ preferences while another knows all of the
women’s preferences. However, the bounds also apply to bounding the total
communication in the fully distributed case where there are 2n processors each
holding a single preference list. In fact, the two player scenario is equivalent to
the 2n scenario where all players of the same gender are allowed to communicate
free of charge.
In [1] the authors consider a restricted version of the stable matching problem
where all preferences are governed by weights associated to each edge. They con-
sider a “billboard” model of communication where in each round, every player is
allowed to broadcast a single message of length O(log n) to a billboard to which
all players have access. The authors show that for a restricted model of deter-
ministic computation, computing a stable matching in this way requires Ω(n)
rounds of posting. Our communication lower bound naturally generalizes this
result to randomized and nondeterministic protocols and approximate stable
matchings. Indeed, in each round, the 2n players can post at most O(2n log n)
bits to the billboard. Hence Ω(n/ log n) rounds are required to find an approx-
imate stable matching. This is clearly optimal up to logarithmic factor, as the
players could simply post their entire input in n rounds.
5.2 Work to be done
Up to logarithmic factors, theorems 2 and 5 are asymptotically tight. A natural
question is whether the logarithmic gap can be closed. In a different vein, the
lower bound in theorem 5 could be improved by considering a coarser notion of
approximate stability.
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